Suchergebnisse

Does the extent of cheating depend on a proper reference point? We use a real effort task that implements a two (gain versus loss frame) times two (monitored performance versus unmonitored performance) between-subjects design to examine whether cheating is reference-dependent. Our experimental findings show that self-reported performance in the unmonitored condition is significantly higher than actual performance in the monitored condition - a clear indication for cheating. However, the level of cheating is by far higher in the loss frame than in the gain frame. Furthermore, men are much more strongly affected by the framing than women.

A three-stage game of production technology, signal and price competition is developed to study the impact of eco-labeling, in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation. The production technology and the subsequent pollution level are non-observable by consumers. The only way to inform consumers about the environmental quality of the product is to stick an ecolabel on it. However, a polluting firm may also usurp the ecolabel by incurring a certain cost. By assuming that consumers are altruistic and willing to pay for environmental quality, we show that ecolabels can reduce the pollution level. Finally and importantly, under restrictive conditions on labeling cost, ecolabeling can constitute to some extent an environmentally effective and economically efficient policy. However, ecolabeling cannot alone internalize the whole negative externality until the optimum point. ; On analyse les impacts d'un écolabel dans un modèle de différenciation verticale en duopole. Nous considérons un jeu à trois étapes où deux entreprises choisissent simultanément la technologie de production, le signal et le prix du produit. La technologie de production n'est pas observable par les consommateurs. La seule moyen pour l'entreprise d'informer les consommateurs sur la qualité environnementale du produit est d'apposer un écolabel sur le produit. Toutefois, une entreprise polluante a la possibilité d'usurper l'écolabel à un certain coût. En supposant que les consommateurs ont des préférences altruistes et sont donc disposés à payer pour la qualité environnementale, on montre que l'écolabel peut réduire les pollutions. Sous certaines conditions de coûts d'écolabelisation, l'écolabel peut constituer une politique efficace à la fois au niveau environnemental et économique. En revanche, un écolabel ne permet pas de réduire totalement les externalités environnementales.

SUMMARYPirates are not only copiers, they can also be innovators. They possess skills and a creative capital that allow them to explore new directions. Their innovations can be freely and profitably re‐appropriated by the high‐end designers of the pirated firms. Creative pirates are engaged in a kind of tacit reciprocity, where they appropriate illegally creations of high end designers and launch modified or new versions that can in return inspire in a profitable way, the designers of the original fashion houses. Moreover, pirates can create a pro‐competitive environment that stimulates the innovative abilities of the pirated firm at unexpected levels without piracy.

Scandals are frequently considered as detrimental for involved businesses. When hotels serve as a backdrop and are collateral victims of scandals caused by high-profile individuals, we argue that entrepreneurially minded executives can envision scandals as an unexpected opportunity, likely to bring good news to the involved hotels. Tourism businesses offer supportive evidence. In a constructivist perspective, scandals and their consequences do not result from the transgression seriousness, but are socially constructed. Entrepreneurially minded individuals influence this social construction and seek to transform scandals into entrepreneurial opportunities. We analyse whether and how hospitality executives can channel the a priori destructive forces involved in a scandal eruption towards a direction aligned with their own interests. We identify three potential mechanisms by which hospitality executives can make the best of scandals, namely, by increasing exposure and attracting attention at a low cost, offering a basis for differentiation and innovation and generating useful marketing data. We identify some conditions that make this outcome more likely. Rather than just avoiding or containing the scandal consequences, we propose to equip hospitality executives with a scandal management plan that explicitly considers the bright side of scandals.

Behavioral public administration theory suggests that seemingly irrelevant word choice manipulations can influence behavior. We contend that the power of words has frequently been overlooked in the COVID-19 crisis. Given that most decisions mobilize System 1 cognition, words can be an important tool in pursuing socially-desirable outcomes. Beyond their substantive content, words choice matters because language operates largely via automatic processes. Based on findings from this literature, words can be harnessed to induce behavioral change aligned with public health objectives. We elucidate several mechanisms through which these effects are likely to occur and suggests concrete applications to the COVID-19 crisis.

AbstractGiven that counterfeiting cannot be easily eliminated, we develop four approaches by which luxury wine producers can leverage the opportunities of being counterfeited. Counterfeit wines can increase brand exposure and awareness and serve as gateways for their genuine counterparts. Genuine producers can exploit the existence of counterfeit wines to develop innovative wine‐based experiences that cannot be counterfeited and boost innovation strategies.

A priori, les débats concernant le genre de l'article défini devant précéder le terme Covid-19 semblent plutôt relever de considérations grammaticales et linguistiques. Néanmoins, suite à des travaux récents (Farrow et al. [2018]) invitant à examiner de plus près les mots comme des leviers d'influence des perceptions et des comportements humains, nous testons expérimentalement si le choix de l'article devant précéder le terme Covid-19 aurait pu contribuer à des politiques publiques plus efficaces. Les résultats montrent que ce choix apparemment anodin ne l'est pas et suggèrent que, dans le cadre d'une stratégie de lutte contre la propagation du virus, l'article masculin aurait pu être plus opportun.

A common practice in managerial and public service contexts is to quantity, calculate, and use numbers and metrics which provide a presumption of scientificity, a sense of measurability, objectivity, reliability, and precision upon which smarter decisions can be made. Besides providing a theoretical background, we analyze counter-productive effects of over-relying on numbers and metrics, notably in public administration. We discuss the following traps: preferring what is measurable over what is important, replacing the strategy by a measure and dehumanizing the decision making. We suggest some practical ways to facilitate a more parsimonious, smarter, and adequate use of numbers.

SUMMARYScandals are pervasive in many areas of society. We propose a characterization of scandals that explicitly considers their potential benefits to transgressors. Although scandals are frequently considered to be undesirable to the targets or transgressors implicated, we develop four rationales by which a scandal can actually be beneficial to them. First, a scandal can propel an individual, organization or cause into the limelight and generate low‐cost publicity that can serve the target's interest, e.g., by increasing the visibility and salience of a particular issue or providing them a platform to spin the scandal with the megaphone of mass media coverage. Second, a scandal target can choose to play the role of altruistic or self‐seeking scapegoat. Third, a scandal target can use a scandal as a smokescreen to divert attention from other more serious issues. Fourth, a scandal can serve as a way to disadvantage competitors or rivals. For each rationale, we suggest some conditions of its success. Anecdotal evidence and real‐world examples are also provided to illustrate and support these rationales.